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Extending the car key metaphor
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README.org
@ -717,6 +717,7 @@ In this case, if the message was nice, Alice might refund Bob one
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or both stamps.
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She might even decide to hand him the authority to send messages to
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her in the future, for free.
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But say Bob is a spammer and is sending a Viagra ad; Alice can keep
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the stamps.
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Now Bob has to "pay" Alice to be spammed (and depending on how we
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@ -735,7 +736,7 @@ While we do not claim that we can fully model a system of consent in
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this system, we can provide the
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/maximum amount of consent that is possible to represent/
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in a system.
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Hopefully that is far enough; it would certainly be better than wha
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Hopefully that is far enough; it would certainly be better than what
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we have now.
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This document does not specify particular mechanisms but opens up
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@ -768,32 +769,79 @@ there is a lot we can make better.
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* How to build it
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** Object capabilities (ocaps)
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*** But really, what is the ocap paradigm, I'm confused
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The foundation of our system will be object capabilities
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(ocaps).
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In order to "give" access to someone, we actually hand them a
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capability.
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Ocaps are authority-by-possession: holding onto them is what gives
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you the power to invoke (use) them.
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If you don't have a reference to an ocap, you can't invoke it.
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So far we've spoken of object capabilities only at a high level.
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Regrettably, I'm going to continue that for this subsection, but I
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promise to get into the implementation details in the next section.
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For the moment, I'm going to continue the high-level, long-spun
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ocap introductory narrative of ocaps as car keys.
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*** Extending the car key metaphor
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We previously gave an example of object capabilities as being like a
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car key: possessing them is what gives you access, rather than who you
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are being what gives you access (the car doesn't need to scan your face;
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if you have the key, you can drive).
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Like a car key, you can also hand ocaps to other people and they can
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use them (delegation).
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We equated this to car keys before; the car doesn't care who you
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are, it only cares that you turn it on using the car key.
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(Note: though capabilities can also be built on top of cryptographic
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keys, we're strictly talking about car keys for the moment.)
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We can extend the car-key metaphor further, and find out there are
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some interesting things we could do:
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- *delegation*: We could hand the car key to a friend.
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We could even make a copy for a trusted friend or loved one.
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- *attenuation*: We could hand out a car key that is more limited
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than the more powerful one we have.
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For example, if we go somewhere with full-service-parking, we can
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construct and hand the valet a "valet key" that only permits
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driving five miles and won't open the glove box or trunk.
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Sorry kid, you're not getting a joy ride this time.
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- *revocation*: Let's say that Alice wants to allow her roommate
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Bob to drive her car, but she also wants to be able to take away
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that right if Bob misuses it or if they stop being roommates.
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Alice can make a new car key that has a wire inside of it;
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Alice holds onto a device where if she presses the button, the
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key "self destructs" (ie the wire melts).
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Now Alice can stop Bob from being able to drive the car if she
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wants to (and if she does, it'll also disable access to anyone
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else Bob has delegated a key to).
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- *accountability*: Alice has multiple roommates, and while she would
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like to allow them all to drive her car, the next time someone
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spills a drink in the car and doesn't clean it up, she wants to know
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who to blame by seeing who drove the car last.
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Alice can achieve this via *composition*: she installs a separate
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"logging" panel into the dashboard of her car, to which she has the
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capability to view the logs.
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Next, for the keys that she hands her roommates, she composes together
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access to drive the car with the logging service and associates each
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key with her roommate's name.
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Now each time one of her roommates uses one of these keys, the logging
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console (which only Alice has access to) takes note of the associated
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name, so Alice can check who left a mess last.
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You may have noticed that as we went further in the examples, the
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ability to construct such rich capabilities on the fly seemed less
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aligned with the physical car key metaphor (not that it wouldn't be
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possible, but certainly not with such ease, and certainly not with any
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cars that exist today).
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And yet ocap systems easily do give us this power.
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We will take advantage of this power to construct the systems we want
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and need.
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*** Principle of Least Authority meets normal code flow
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[... continue with valet and revocation car key metaphors here?]
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*** Ocaps as capability URLs
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That's all good and well, but real-world metaphors
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*** Ocaps as bearcaps
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*** Ocaps meet ActivityPub objects/actors
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** Delegation, attenuation, revocation, composition, accountability
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# and composition?
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** True names, public profiles, private profiles
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