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Following up on: https://github.com/TokTok/c-toxcore/issues/419
I don't think indistinguishable message bytes and sizes are going to make any difference when they are sent over a network of so few bootstrap nodes. And anyone operating in a hostile environment is probably already running Tox over Tor, which works well.
Did the reports of blocking in China include blocking over Tor? Tor itself has implemented pluggable transport mechanisms that are continuously being improved, and these include ways to make the traffic look like another protocol like HTTP or whatever: https://snowflake.torproject.org/
So the best way to handle this may be to improve the documentation in Tox clients of how to use Tor. Whether or not you trust Tor (you can't trust exit nodes >25% of the time) it is the only thing that works right now in e.g. Egypt or Iran. And people can test the Tor setup with their brower (or TorBrowser) to make sure they are working before they try Tox over Tor.
The only way of getting a lot of resilience "cheaply" is to encourage bootstrap node operators to also run a Tor client to serve the node over Onionv3. This is the only way I can see dealing with the fact that Tox is a network of so few bootstrap nodes. If the Tox nodebase was improved to serve BS nodes, and OnionV3 relays, it would be much more resilient. I'm assuming the adversaries cannot block .onion addresses within Tor, which I think is a valid assumption for now.
There is a way of configuring a Tor client to uniquely assign a
life-of-the-tor-instance IPv4 address from a predefined private range
(VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4) to each onion address it sees:
AutomapHostsOnResolve 1
. So Tox could use OnionV3 BS nodes in a
properly configured Tor with just some properly configured BS hosts lists
(if enough BS nodes provided OnionV3 addresses). Then we could leave
the heavy lifting of the
cat-and-mouse games
of pluggable transports etc. to Tor, and not try to chase them ourselves.
If you have such a list of onion addresses, the Tor user, who is running a Tor
instance anyway to connect with the Tox client, adds this to the
/etc/tor/torrc
VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4 172.16.0.0/12
AutomapHostsOnResolve 1
Then with the list of onion addresses for BS nodes that are running Tox
as OnionV3, you can simply add aliases for the OnionV3 BS nodes directly
into the /etc/torrc
with the MapAddress
command:
MapAddress h5g52d26mmi67pzzln2uya5msfzjdewengefaj75diipeskoo252lnqd.onion 172.16.0.1
Orbot on Android
supports the user adding custom lines to the torrc
so you don't
need to be rooted on Android.
Or you can use tor-resolve
or tor-resolve -4
to get the
good-for-you-only IP addresses of OnionV3 BS nodes in IPv4. So the Tox user
does this, and then puts these addresses into his DHTnodes.json
and boostraps his Tox client over Tor Onions . This works with
libtoxcore is it is today, as long as your client doesn't suffer from
the dreaded deranged-hard-coded-bs syndrome.
If we adopt a convention of putting a new onions field in the DHTnodes.json, this process could be automated by a simple Python script. The script could:
- download the nodes file,
- check for the location or onions field,
- test the connection to the onion,
- use tor-resolve to get the IPv4 address
- add the address to the DHTnodes.json
- repeat and rinse daily.
These steps would be automated by a simple bash or Python script, perhaps a Python script wrapped into an exe for Windows/Android. If you use MapAddress these mapped addresses are stable life of the Tor instance and the script would need rerunning when Tor is restarted. You can do the equivalent of tor-resolve in standard Python.
The best thing we can do is to make these instructions available with Tox downloads, and to ensure that all distributions of Tox come with the script on all platforms.
It's currently impossible to test as there is no equivalent
to the other/fun/bootstrap_node_info.py
script for TCP connections.
For UDP you can send a packet of len 78 with the magic first bytes and get a
version and MOTD reply. Not so for TCP (in fact if you do send such a packet
to the TCP it send the BS node into an
infinite loop for which it neverrecovers).
So we need a simple fix to the TCP_server code to at least look for a
special packet like this and be nice and send a simple nice reply like
the UDP case. Raised as https://github.com/TokTok/c-toxcore/issues/2331
We should not kid ourselves that we don't all live in China or Iran - the planet is in a loc$down, and I think we might quickly find out just how much resiliance we need. s/China/Iran/Syria/Russia/GDR
- https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/12/07/why-the-kremlin-blocking-tor-is-a-big-deal-a75751
- https://www.wired.com/story/russia-block-tor-censorship/
- https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/05/syrian-man-middle-against-facebook
- https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/biden-executive-order-allows-spying-on-americans-to-assess-political-instability-climate-threats/
PS: I doubt tor-resolve comes with OrBot and I doubt it comes with Tor on Windows or Torbrowser on Windows. We could ask the maintainers of TRIfA and aTOX to include it in their distributions, but if our script is in Python, we don't need it.