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Added well-known downloading

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emdee 2022-11-07 11:38:22 +00:00
parent e7e3ddd20d
commit 2be5e6e66e
3 changed files with 564 additions and 34 deletions
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58
README.md
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@ -1,2 +1,58 @@
# exclude_badExits
# https://github.com/nusenu/noContactInfo_Exit_Excluder
# https://github.com/TheSmashy/TorExitRelayExclude
This extends nusenu's basic idea of using the stem library to
dynamically exclude nodes that are likely to be bad by putting them
on the ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes setting of a running Tor.
* https://github.com/nusenu/noContactInfo_Exit_Excluder
* https://github.com/TheSmashy/TorExitRelayExclude
The basic cut is to exclude Exit nodes that do not have a contact.
That can be extended to nodes that do not have an email in the contact etc.
But there's a problem, and your Tor notice.log will tell you about it:
you could exclude the nodes needed to access hidden services etc.
So we need to add to the process the concept of a whitelist.
In addition, we may have our own blacklist of nodes we want to exclude.
So we make two files that are structured in YAML:
```
/etc/tor/torrc-goodnodes.yaml
Nodes:
IntroductionPoints:
- $NODEFINGERPRINT
...
By default all sections of the goodnodes.yaml are used as a whitelist.
/etc/tor/torrc-badnodes.yaml
Nodes:
ExcludeExitNodes:
BadExit:
# $0000000000000000000000000000000000000007
```
That part requires [PyYAML](https://pyyaml.org/wiki/PyYAML)
https://github.com/yaml/pyyaml/
Right now only the ExcludeExitNodes section is used by we may add ExcludeNodes
later, and by default all sub-sections of the badnodes.yaml are used as a
ExcludeExitNodes but it can be customized with the lWanted commandline arg.
The original idea has also been extended to add different conditions for
exclusion: the ```--contact``` commandline arg is a comma sep list of conditions:
* Empty - no contact info
* NoEmail - no @ sign in the contact',
More may be added later.
Because you don't want to exclude the introduction points to any onion
you want to connect to, ```--white_onions``` should whitelist the
introduction points to a comma sep list of onions, but is
currently broken in stem 1.8.0: see:
* https://github.com/torproject/stem/issues/96
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/25417
```--bad_output``` will write the torrc configuration to a file.
```--details_output``` will write the lookup URLs of the excluded nodes to a file
For usage, do ```python3 exclude_badExits.py --help`

192
exclude_badExits.py
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@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ on the ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes setting of a running Tor.
The basic cut is to exclude Exit nodes that do not have a contact.
That can be extended to nodes that do not have an email in the contact etc.
"""
"""
But there's a problem, and your Tor notice.log will tell you about it:
you could exclude the nodes needed to access hidden services or
directorues. So we need to add to the process the concept of a whitelist.
@ -53,24 +54,35 @@ currently broken in stem 1.8.0: see:
* https://github.com/torproject/stem/issues/96
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/25417
```--bad_output``` will write the torrc configuration to a file.
```--bad_output``` will write the torrc ExcludeNodes configuration to a file.
```--details_output``` will write the lookup URLs of the excluded nodes to a file
```--proof_output``` will write the contact info as a ciiss dictionary
to a YAML file. If the proof is uri-rsa, the well-known file of fingerprints
is downloaded and the fingerprints are added to the on the 'fps' field
of that fingerprint entry of the YAML dictionary. This file is read at the
beginning of the program to start with a trust database, and only new
relays are added to the dictionary. The 'fps' field is emptied if the
host fails to provide the well-known file. You can expect it to take
an hour or two the first time this is run: >700 domains.
For usage, do ```python3 exclude_badExits.py --help`
"""
import sys
from stem.control import Controller
from stem.util.tor_tools import is_valid_fingerprint
import os
import getpass
import re
import time
import argparse
from io import StringIO
from stem.control import Controller
from stem.connection import IncorrectPassword
from stem.util.tor_tools import is_valid_fingerprint
try:
import yaml
except:
@ -83,16 +95,18 @@ try:
# https://pypi.org/project/coloredlogs/
except ImportError as e:
coloredlogs = False
from trustor_poc import lDownloadUrlFps
global LOG
import logging
LOG = logging.getLogger()
aTRUST_DB = {}
sDETAILS_URL = "https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/"
# You can call this while bootstrapping
def oMakeController(sSock='/run/tor/control', port=9051):
if os.path.exists(sSock):
def oMakeController(sSock='', port=9051):
if sSock and os.path.exists(sSock):
controller = Controller.from_socket_file(path=sSock)
else:
controller = Controller.from_port(port=port)
@ -148,23 +162,85 @@ def lIntroductionPoints(lOnions):
l += [introduction_point.address]
return l
# memory?
lINTS = ['ciissversion', 'uplinkbw', 'signingkeylifetime']
lBOOLS = ['dnssec', 'dnsqname', 'aesni', 'autoupdate', 'dnslocalrootzone'
'sandbox', 'offlinemasterkey']
def aVerifyContact(a, fp, timeout=20, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050):
for elt in lINTS:
if elt in a:
a[elt] = int(a[elt])
for elt in lBOOLS:
if elt in a:
if a[elt] in ['y','yes', 'true', 'True']:
a[elt] = True
else:
a[elt] = False
# just stick fp in for now
a.update({'fps': [fp]})
# test the url for fps and add it to the array
if 'proof' not in a:
# only support uri for now
LOG.warn(f"{fp} 'proof' not in {list(a.keys())}")
return a
if a['proof'] not in ['uri-rsa']:
# only support uri for now
LOG.warn(f"{fp} proof={a['proof']} not supported yet")
return a
if 'url' not in a:
LOG.warn(f"{fp} 'proof' is 'uri-rsa' but url not in {list(a.keys())}")
return a
if a['url'].startswith('http:'):
a['url'] = 'https:' +a['url'][5:]
elif not a['url'].startswith('https:'):
a['url'] = 'https:' +a['url']
domain = a['url'][8:]
LOG.debug(f"{len(list(a.keys()))} contact fields for {fp}")
LOG.info(f"Downloading from {domain} for {fp}")
try:
l = lDownloadUrlFps(domain, timeout=20, host=host, port=port)
except Exception as e:
LOG.exception(f"Error downloading from {domain} for {fp} {e}")
# should we put it's FPs from TRUST_DB on the ExcludeExitNodes?
a['fps'] = []
else:
if not l:
LOG.warn(f"Downloading from {domain} failed for {fp}")
a['fps'] = []
else:
a['fps'] = l
return a
def aParseContact(contact, fp):
contact = str(contact, 'UTF-8')
l = [line for line in contact.strip().replace('"', '').split(' ')
if ':' in line]
LOG.debug(f"{fp} {len(l)} fields")
s = f'"{fp}":\n'
s += '\n'.join([f" {line}\"".replace(':',': \"', 1)
for line in l])
oFd = StringIO(s)
a = yaml.safe_load(oFd)
return a
def oMainArgparser(_=None):
# 'Mode: 0=chat 1=chat+audio 2=chat+audio+video default: 0'
if not os.path.exists('/proc/sys/net/ipv6'):
bIpV6 = 'False'
else:
bIpV6 = 'True'
lIpV6Choices=[bIpV6, 'False']
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(add_help=True)
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(add_help=True,
epilog=__doc__)
parser.add_argument('--proxy_host', '--proxy-host', type=str,
default='127.0.0.1',
help='proxy host')
parser.add_argument('--proxy_port', '--proxy-port', default=9051, type=int,
parser.add_argument('--proxy_port', '--proxy-port', default=9050, type=int,
help='proxy control port')
parser.add_argument('--proxy_ctl', '--proxy-ctl',
default='/run/tor/control', type=str,
help='control socket - takes precedence over proxy_port')
default='/run/tor/control',
type=str,
help='control socket - or port')
parser.add_argument('--timeout', default=20, type=int,
help='proxy download timeout')
parser.add_argument('--good_nodes', type=str,
default='/etc/tor/torrc-goodnodes.yaml',
help="Yaml file of good nodes that should not be excluded")
@ -187,10 +263,13 @@ def oMainArgparser(_=None):
help="Write the torrc configuration to a file")
parser.add_argument('--details_output', type=str, default='',
help="Write the lookup URLs of the excluded nodes to a file")
parser.add_argument('--proof_output', type=str, default='',
help="Write the proof data of the included nodes to a YAML file")
return parser
def iMain(lArgs):
global oTOX_OARGS
global aTRUST_DB
parser = oMainArgparser()
oArgs = parser.parse_args(lArgs)
@ -200,14 +279,25 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
force=True)
logging.basicConfig(**aKw)
logging.getLogger('stem').setLevel(oArgs.log_level)
controller = oMakeController(oArgs.proxy_ctl, oArgs.proxy_port)
sFile = oArgs.proof_output
if sFile and os.path.exists(sFile):
with open(sFile, 'rt') as oFd:
aTRUST_DB = yaml.safe_load(oFd)
if oArgs.proxy_ctl.startswith('/') or os.path.exists(oArgs.proxy_ctl):
controller = oMakeController(sSock=oArgs.proxy_ctl)
else:
port =int(oArgs.proxy_ctl)
controller = oMakeController(port=port)
elt = controller.get_conf('UseMicrodescriptors')
if elt != '0' :
LOG.error('"UseMicrodescriptors 0" is required in your /etc/tor/torrc. Exiting.')
return 2
LOG.warn('"UseMicrodescriptors 0" is required in your /etc/tor/torrc. Exiting.')
controller.set_conf('UseMicrodescriptors', 0)
# does it work dynamically?
# return 2
percent = i = 0
# You can call this while boostrapping
while percent < 100 and i < oArgs.wait_boot:
@ -225,7 +315,7 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
LOG.info(f'lYamlGoodNodes {len(lGood)}')
if oArgs.white_onions:
l = lIntroductionPoints(oArgs.white_onions.split(,))
l = lIntroductionPoints(oArgs.white_onions.split(','))
lGood += l
relays = controller.get_server_descriptors()
@ -243,30 +333,63 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
else:
oFd = None
lProofUriFps = []
aProofUri = {}
lConds = oArgs.contact.split(',')
for relay in relays:
if not relay.exit_policy.is_exiting_allowed(): continue
if not is_valid_fingerprint(relay.fingerprint):
LOG.warn('Invalid Fingerprint: %s' % relay.fingerprint)
continue
if relay.fingerprint in aTRUST_DB:
if aTRUST_DB[relay.fingerprint]['fps']:
lProofUriFps += aTRUST_DB[relay.fingerprint]['fps']
if relay.fingerprint in lProofUriFps:
# we already have it.
continue
if relay.contact and b'proof:uri-rsa' in relay.contact.lower():
a = aParseContact(relay.contact, relay.fingerprint)
if not a: continue
b = aVerifyContact(list(a.values())[0], relay.fingerprint,
timeout=oArgs.timeout,
host=oArgs.proxy_host,
port=oArgs.proxy_port)
if not b:
continue
if 'fps' in b and b['fps'] and relay.fingerprint in b['fps']:
lProofUriFps += b['fps']
aProofUri[relay.fingerprint] = b
if ('Empty' in lConds and not relay.contact) or \
('NoEmail' in lConds and relay.contact and not b'@' in relay.contact):
if is_valid_fingerprint(relay.fingerprint):
exit_excludelist.append(relay.fingerprint)
if oFd:
oFd.write(sDETAILS_URL +relay.fingerprint +"\n")
else:
LOG.warn('Invalid Fingerprint: %s' % relay.fingerprint)
if oFd:
LOG.info(f"Wrote details URLs to {oArgs.details_output}")
oFd.close()
exit_excludelist.append(relay.fingerprint)
if oFd:
oFd.write(sDETAILS_URL +relay.fingerprint +"\n")
exit_excludelist = list(set(exit_excludelist).difference(set(lGood)))
LOG.info(f'ExcludeExitNodes {len(exit_excludelist)} net bad exit nodes')
controller.set_conf('ExcludeExitNodes', exit_excludelist)
elt = controller.get_conf('ExcludeExitNodes')
if oArgs.bad_output:
with open(oArgs.bad_output, 'wt') as oFd:
oFd.write(f"ExcludeExitNodes {','.join(exit_excludelist)}\n")
with open(oArgs.bad_output, 'wt') as oFdE:
oFdE.write(f"ExcludeExitNodes {','.join(exit_excludelist)}\n")
LOG.info(f"Wrote tor configuration to {oArgs.bad_output}")
if lProofUriFps:
LOG.info(f'ExitNodes {len(lProofUriFps)} good exit nodes')
controller.set_conf('ExitNodes', lProofUriFps)
if oFd:
LOG.info(f"Wrote details URLs to {oArgs.details_output}")
oFd.close()
if oArgs.proof_output:
with open(oArgs.proof_output, 'wt') as oFdD:
s = yaml.dump_all(aProofUri, indent=2, stream=None)
oFdD.write(s +'\n')
LOG.info(f"Wrote proof details to {oArgs.proof_output}")
oFdD.close()
logging.getLogger('stem').setLevel(40)
for elt in controller._event_listeners:
controller.remove_event_listener(elt)
@ -277,6 +400,9 @@ def iMain(lArgs):
if __name__ == '__main__':
try:
i = iMain(sys.argv[1:])
except IncorrectPassword as e:
LOG.error(e)
i = 1
except Exception as e:
LOG.exception(e)
i = 1

348
trustor_poc.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
# -*- mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; py-indent-offset: 4; coding: utf-8 -# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import os
import sys
from stem.control import Controller
from stem.util.tor_tools import *
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import requests
import datetime
try:
from unbound import ub_ctx,RR_TYPE_TXT,RR_CLASS_IN
except:
ub_ctx = RR_TYPE_TXT = RR_CLASS_IN = None
global LOG
import logging
LOG = logging.getLogger()
# download this python library from
# https://github.com/erans/torcontactinfoparser
#sys.path.append('/home/....')
try:
from torcontactinfo import TorContactInfoParser
except:
TorContactInfoParser = None
# tor ControlPort IP
controller_address = '127.0.0.1'
dnssec_DS_file = 'dnssec-root-trust'
# this is not the system wide /etc/resolv.conf
# use dnscrypt-proxy to encrypt your DNS and route it via tor's SOCKSPort
libunbound_resolv_file = 'resolv.conf'
# for now we support max_depth = 0 only
# this PoC version has no support for recursion
# https://github.com/nusenu/tor-relay-operator-ids-trust-information#trust-information-consumers
supported_max_depths = ['0']
# https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification#ciissversion
accepted_ciissversions = ['2']
# https://github.com/nusenu/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification#proof
accepted_proof_types = ['uri-rsa','dns-rsa']
# https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2532053/validate-a-hostname-string
# FIXME this check allows non-fqdn names
def is_valid_hostname(hostname):
if len(hostname) > 255:
return False
if hostname[-1] == ".":
hostname = hostname[:-1] # strip exactly one dot from the right, if present
allowed = re.compile("(?!-)[A-Z\d-]{1,63}(?<!-)$", re.IGNORECASE)
return all(allowed.match(x) for x in hostname.split("."))
def read_local_trust_config(trust_config='trust_config'):
'''
reads a local configuration file containing trusted domains
and returns them in an array
'''
result = []
if (os.path.isfile(trust_config)):
f = open(trust_config)
for line in f:
line = line.strip()
if line[0] == '#':
continue
try:
domain, max_depth = line.split(':')
except:
LOG.error('invalid trust config line detected: %s aborting!' % line)
sys.exit(8)
if max_depth in supported_max_depths:
if is_valid_hostname(domain) and domain not in result:
result.append(domain)
else:
LOG.error('invalid duplicate domain in trust config file: %s: %s aborting!' % (trust_config, domain))
sys.exit(9)
else:
LOG.error('unsupported max_depth value (%s) used, aborting!' % line)
sys.exit(10)
return result
else:
LOG.error("trust config file %s missing, aborting!" % trust_config)
sys.exit(11)
def read_local_validation_cache(validation_cache_file, trusted_domains=[]):
'''
reads the local validation cache and returns all fingerprints in the cache
for trusted domains
format of each entry in the cache:
domain:fingerprint:prooftype:date
'''
result = []
if trusted_domains == []:
return result
if (os.path.isfile(validation_cache_file)):
f = open(validation_cache_file)
for line in f:
line = line.strip()
if line[0] == '#':
continue
try:
domain, fingerprint, prooftype, dt = line.split(':')
except:
LOG.error('invalid trust cache entry detected: %s aborting!' % line)
sys.exit(12)
if domain in trusted_domains:
result.append(fingerprint)
else:
print('ignoring cached entry for untrusted domain %s' % domain)
else:
print("Validation cache file not present. It will be created.")
return result
def get_controller(address='127.0.0.1',port=9151,password=''):
'''
connects to a local tor client via the tor ControlPort
and returns a controller that allows us to easily set specific tor
configuration options or read tor relay ContactInfo strings for validation
'''
try:
#controller = Controller.from_socket_file(path=torsocketpath)
controller = Controller.from_port(address=address, port=port)
controller.authenticate(password=password)
except Exception as e:
LOG.error(f'Failed to connect to the tor process, {e}')
sys.exit(1)
if not controller.is_set('UseMicrodescriptors'):
LOG.error('"UseMicrodescriptors 0" is required in your torrc configuration. Exiting.')
sys.exit(2)
return controller
def find_validation_candidates(controller, trusted_domains=[],validation_cache=[],accept_all=False):
'''
connect to a tor client via controlport and return a dict of all
not yet validated fingerprints per trusted operators
format:
{ trusted_domain: { prooftype: [fingerprint, fingerprint, ...]} }
example content:
{ 'emeraldonion.org' : { 'uri-rsa': ['044600FD968728A6F220D5347AD897F421B757C0', '09DCA3360179C6C8A5A20DDDE1C54662965EF1BA']}}
'''
result = {}
try:
relays = controller.get_server_descriptors()
except:
LOG.error('Failed to get relay descriptors via tor\'s ControlPort. Exiting.')
sys.exit(3)
ci = TorContactInfoParser()
for relay in relays:
if relay.contact:
fingerprint = relay.fingerprint
# skip fingerprints we have already successfully validated in the past
# a future version would check the cache age as well
if fingerprint in validation_cache:
continue
contactstring = relay.contact.decode('utf-8')
parsed_ci = ci.parse(contactstring)
if len(parsed_ci) > 0:
if 'ciissversion' in parsed_ci and 'proof' in parsed_ci and 'url' in parsed_ci:
prooftype = parsed_ci['proof']
ciurl = parsed_ci['url']
if parsed_ci['ciissversion'] in accepted_ciissversions and prooftype in accepted_proof_types:
if ciurl.startswith('http://') or ciurl.startswith('https://'):
try:
domain=urlparse(ciurl).netloc
except:
LOG.warning('failed to parse domain %s' % ciurl)
domain='error'
continue
else:
domain=ciurl
if not is_valid_hostname(domain):
domain='error'
continue
# we can ignore relays that do not claim to be operated by a trusted operator
# if we do not accept all
if domain not in trusted_domains and not accept_all:
continue
if domain in result.keys():
if prooftype in result[domain].keys():
result[domain][prooftype].append(fingerprint)
else:
result[domain] = { prooftype : [fingerprint] }
# mixed proof types are not allowd as per spec but we are not strict here
LOG.warning('%s is using mixed prooftypes %s' % (domain, prooftype))
else:
result[domain] = {prooftype : [fingerprint]}
return result
def lDownloadUrlFps(domain, timeout=20, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050):
uri="https://"+domain+"/.well-known/tor-relay/rsa-fingerprint.txt"
# socks proxy used for outbound web requests (for validation of proofs)
proxy = {'https': 'socks5h://' +host +':' +str(port)}
# we use this UA string when connecting to webservers to fetch rsa-fingerprint.txt proof files
# https://nusenu.github.io/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/#uri-rsa
headers = {'User-Agent':'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0'}
LOG.debug("fetching %s...." % uri)
try:
head = requests.head(uri, timeout=timeout, proxies=proxy, headers=headers)
except Exception as e:
print("HTTP HEAD request failed for %s" % uri)
print(e)
head = None
return []
if head.status_code != 200:
return []
if not head.headers['Content-Type'].startswith('text/plain'):
return []
try:
fullfile = requests.get(uri, proxies=proxy, timeout=10, headers=headers)
except:
print("HTTP GET request failed for %s" % uri)
return []
if fullfile.status_code != 200 or not fullfile.headers['Content-Type'].startswith('text/plain'):
return []
#check for redirects (not allowed as per spec)
if fullfile.url != uri:
LOG.error('Redirect detected %s vs %s (final)' % (uri, fullfile.url))
return []
well_known_content = [i.strip() for i in fullfile.text.upper().split('\n')]
return well_known_content
def validate_proofs(candidates, validation_cache_file):
'''
This function takes the return value of find_validation_candidates()
and validated them according to their proof type (uri-rsa, dns-rsa)
and writes properly validated relay fingerprints to the local validation cache
'''
dt_utc = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).date()
f = open(validation_cache_file, mode='a')
count = 0
for domain in candidates.keys():
for prooftype in candidates[domain].keys():
if prooftype == 'uri-rsa':
well_known_content = lDownloadUrlFps(domain, timeout=20, host='127.0.0.1', port=9050)
for fingerprint in candidates[domain][prooftype]:
if fingerprint in well_known_content:
# write cache entry
count += 1
f.write('%s:%s:%s:%s\n' % (domain, fingerprint, prooftype, dt_utc))
else:
LOG.error('%s:%s:%s' % (fingerprint, domain, prooftype))
elif prooftype == 'dns-rsa' and ub_ctx:
for fingerprint in candidates[domain][prooftype]:
fp_domain = fingerprint+'.'+domain
if dns_validate(fp_domain):
count += 1
f.write('%s:%s:%s:%s\n' % (domain, fingerprint, prooftype, dt_utc))
else:
LOG.error('%s:%s:%s' % (fingerprint, domain, prooftype))
f.close()
LOG.info('successfully validated %s new (not yet validated before) relays' % count)
def dns_validate(domain):
'''
performs DNS TXT lookups and verifies the reply
- is DNSSEC valid and
- contains only a single TXT record
- the DNS record contains a hardcoded string as per specification
https://nusenu.github.io/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/#dns-rsa
'''
if not ub_ctx: return False
ctx = ub_ctx()
if (os.path.isfile(libunbound_resolv_file)):
ctx.resolvconf(libunbound_resolv_file)
else:
LOG.error('libunbound resolv config file: "%s" is missing, aborting!' % libunbound_resolv_file)
sys.exit(5)
if (os.path.isfile(dnssec_DS_file)):
ctx.add_ta_file(dnssec_DS_file)
else:
LOG.error('DNSSEC trust anchor file "%s" is missing, aborting!' % dnssec_DS_file)
sys.exit(6)
status, result = ctx.resolve(domain, RR_TYPE_TXT, RR_CLASS_IN)
if status == 0 and result.havedata:
if len(result.rawdata) == 1 and result.secure:
# ignore the first byte, it is the TXT length
if result.data.as_raw_data()[0][1:] == b'we-run-this-tor-relay':
return True
return False
def configure_tor(controller, trusted_fingerprints, exitonly=True):
'''
takes the list of trusted fingerprints and configures a tor client
to only use trusted relays in a certain position
for now we only set exits.
we refuse to set the configuration if there are less then 40 trusted relays
'''
relay_count = len(trusted_fingerprints)
if relay_count < 41:
print('Too few trusted relays (%s), aborting!' % relay_count)
sys.exit(15)
try:
controller.set_conf('ExitNodes', trusted_fingerprints)
print('limited exits to %s relays' % relay_count)
except Exception as e:
print('Failed to set ExitNodes tor config to trusted relays')
print(e)
sys.exit(20)
if __name__ == '__main__':
trust_config = 'trust_config'
assert os.path.exists(trust_config)
trusted_domains = read_local_trust_config(trust_config)
validation_cache_file = 'validation_cache'
trusted_fingerprints = read_local_validation_cache(validation_cache_file,
trusted_domains=trusted_domains)
# tor ControlPort password
controller_password=''
controller = get_controller(address=controller_address,password=controller_password)
r = find_validation_candidates(controller,validation_cache=trusted_fingerprints,trusted_domains=trusted_domains)
validate_proofs(r, validation_cache_file)
# refresh list with newly validated fingerprints
trusted_fingerprints = read_local_validation_cache(trusted_domains=trusted_domains)
configure_tor(controller, trusted_fingerprints)